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The evolution of human cooperation is a long-standing puzzle that has received
much recent attention. Research has focused on three nested questions. First:
how can altruistic behavior survive evolutionary pressures at all (Hamilton,
1964a,b; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004; Nowak, 2006)? Second: how can cooper-
ation evolve in large groups of unrelated individuals (Boyd and Richerson,
1988; Boyd et al. 2003)? Third: why does large-scale cooperation among un-
related individuals seem to be a distinctly human phenomenon (Bernhard et
al., 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Gintis 2000;
Bowles, 2006)?
A number of compelling arguments have been forwarded for resolving the ﬁrst
two questions. These include: kin selection and inclusive ﬁtness (Hamilton,
1964a,b); reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984); altruistic pun-
ishment (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Henrich and Boyd, 2001) and reputation
(Rockenback and Milinski (2006)); group and multi-level selection (Maynard-
Smith, 1964; Wilson and Sober, 1994); assortative matching (Wright, 1921;
Bergstrom, 2002); and spatial eﬀects and imitation (Nowak and May, 1992;
Grim, 1995; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004; Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Langer et
al. 2008).
The puzzle of human exceptionalism is a particularly active topic of research
(Gintis, 2000; Bowles, 2006; Boyd, 2006; Wilson and Wilson, 2007; Johnson
et al., 2008). As articulated by Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), a fully successful
resolution requires showing that large-scale cooperation is possible precisely
because of some characteristic “quantitatively, or probably even qualitatively,
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unique” (page 785) to humans. The core of this paper is a very simple model
with precisely this feature.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers a completely standard
ﬁnitely repeated public goods game (n player Prisoners’ Dilemma) model of
evolutionary dynamics. In this game, reciprocal altruists compete with un-
conditional defectors, as in Cohen and Eshel (1976). Evolutionary dynamics
can support cooperation in small groups in this model, but, as in Boyd and
Richerson (1988), cooperation becomes unsustainable as group size grows.
Section 3 then tweaks the model by replacing the unconditional defectors with
non-cooperative agents who are more recognizably human: they are intrinsi-
cally non-cooperative in the sense that they are purely self-interested, but they
play strategically. So, even though they are not intrinsically cooperative, they
can behave cooperatively when it is in their own selﬁsh best interest. This
simple modiﬁcation completely reverses the standard result: identical evolu-
tionary dynamics not only can support cooperative behavior in large groups,
but cooperative behavior is actually ensured in suﬃciently large groups.
This result is similar to Johnson et al.’s (2008) discussion of the consequences of
replacing “Tit for Tat” reciprocators with “continuous” reciprocators in Boyd
and Richerson’s (1988) model, in that it highlights the sensitivity of Boyd
and Richerson’s conclusions to the speciﬁcation of strategies of the players. It
diﬀers in several important respects, however.
First, the model presented here provides a simple and clean example to illus-
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trate how sapience (speciﬁcally: strategic foresight) can greatly enhance the
survival of cooperation in large groups. In this respect, it directly addresses
why large-group cooperation might be particular to humans.
Second, Johnson et al. (2008) interpret the sensitivity of Boyd and Richerson’s
results as evidence in favor of individual rather than group selection as the un-
derlying mechanism for human cooperation. The present results are based on
a model with similar dynamics, but here they can be interpreted as support-
ing group selection mechanisms. Speciﬁcally, a particularly intriguing feature
that appears in this model is a stark dichotomy between phenotypically coop-
erative behavior of individuals in groups and the genotypically uncooperative
nature of the majority of those individuals. This is an example of a point em-
phasized by Wilson (2004): in the context of complicated phenotype-genotype
relationships, absolute ﬁtness advantages can fail to translate into relative ﬁt-
ness advantages, even with randomly formed groups. In Section 3’s model,
strategically rational types have an absolute ﬁtness advantage, but, ironically,
their strategic foresight helps ensure the continued survival of genotypically co-
operative non-strategic individuals by facilitating broad cooperation in groups
within which the later represent only a distinct minority. This allows the coop-
erative genotype to maintain a relative ﬁtness advantage despite representing
only a small proportion of the population.
Group or “multi-level selection” explanations for human cooperation espoused,
for example, by Bowles (2006) and Wilson and Wilson (2007) emphasize the
importance of social control and culturally transmitted norms in facilitating
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group or multi-level selection in human populations. Sapience clearly plays an
important, if indirect, role in these sorts of stories. The present results indicate
how sapience can directly enhance the evolution of cooperation in large groups,
even in the absence of complex systems of social control or cultural and moral
norms. Presumably, these direct eﬀects reinforce the cultural norm eﬀects.
The stark reversal of the large-scale survival of cooperative behavior with sapi-
ent actors in place of unconditional defectors is striking. There are a number of
reasons to interpret this result with some caution, however. For example, the
formal results in Section 3 rely on a number of simpliﬁcations, including: (i)
the observability of type; (ii) a continuum of individuals; (iii) a zero mutation
rate; and (iv) a signiﬁcant (though not exorbitant) level of reasoning capacity
for the strategic agents. Section 4 the extent to which these are reasonable
abstractions.
Section 5 oﬀers some brief conclusions. Proofs of key results appear in the
Appendix.
1 The Evolutionary Model
The evolutionary model is a version of the Haystack model (Maynard-Smith,
1964). Each generation t consists of a unit measure of individuals. Individuals
are sorted randomly (non-assortatively) into groups (the haystacks) with n
players. The n individuals within each group play an M times repeated public
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goods game. At the end of the M periods, generation t individuals reproduce
asexually. The fraction of generation t + 1 players who are the oﬀspring of a
given generation t individual is proportional to the generation t individual’s
M-period payoﬀ. The generation t+1 individuals are then assigned randomly
to new groups (haystacks) of size n, play the repeated public goods game,
reproduce... and so on.
In each of the M periods of the public goods, each of the n individuals chooses
whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If j individuals play C in a given
period, those who cooperate and those who defect receive period payoﬀs of
βj and βj + 1, respectively. The interpretation is that each player has a unit
endowment which she can consume (playing D) or contribute to a public good
(playing C). The latter strategy provides a beneﬁt β to each individual in the
group, including herself. Contributions are assumed to be socially productive
(βn > 1) but individually harmful (β < 1). For technical reasons, β is further
assumed to satisfy the slightly stronger condition: βn ≥ (2− β) > 1.
Individuals’ strategies are determined by their genetic “type,” which is trans-
mitted without mutation from parent to child. (The no-mutation assumption
is inessential but expositionally convenient.) Specifying the set of “types” de-
termines the play of the game and hence the evolutionary dynamics. The
following two sections analyze these dynamics with two distinct sets of types.
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2 The Baseline Model
This section considers a model with two types. Uncooperative types (U-types)
are unconditional defectors: they play D each period. Reciprocal altruists,
or “Tit-for-Tats” (T -types), play C as long as all members of their group
cooperated in the preceding period. 2
2.1 Payoﬀs
Let j index the number of T -types in a given group. All individuals will co-
operate in all n periods in groups with j = n. In groups with j < n, the j
T -types will cooperate in period 1, the (n − j) U-types will defect in period
1, and all individuals will defect in periods 2, · · · ,M . Payoﬀs uT (j) and uU(j)
to T and U types are therefore given as follows:
j = 0 0 < j < n j = n
uT (j) −− βj + M − 1 βMn
uU(j) M βj + M −−
(1)
For notational ease, deﬁne uU(n) = 0 and uT (0) = M − 1. Then uU(j) =
2 Boyd and Richerson (1988) consider generalized T -types who cooperate so long
as fewer than a members defected in the preceding period. Allowing for these types
is expositionally more cumbersome, but it does not materially aﬀect the results.
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uT (j) + 1 for all j.
2.2 Dynamics
Let pt denote the fraction of T types in generation t. Random assignment
implies that the fraction of generation t individuals who are in groups with j
T -types is given by the binomial density,





pjt (1− pt)n−j. (2)
It will also be useful to use the cumulative distribution function (the proportion
of the population in groups with no more than j types):
F (n, j, p) =
j∑
i=0
f(n, j, p). (3)
Evolutionary dynamics are given by the map Dn : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] from the pro-
portion pt of T -types in generation t to the proportion pt+1 in the subsequent
generation:
Dn : pt → pt+1 =
∑n
j=0 f(n, j, pt)juT (j)∑n
j=0 f(n, j, pt) [juT (j) + (n− j)uU(j)]
. (4)
(These are simply the “replicator” dynamics described in, e.g., Taylor and
Jonker (1978).) Theorem 1 summarizes the properties of these dynamics.
Theorem 1 (Baseline Dynamics) The mapping Dn described in Equation






Points p and p are stable. Point p∗ is unstable.
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[Insert ﬁgure 1(a) and (b) about here]
The Appendix contains a formal proof of this well known result.
Theorem 1 implies that, for any n, evolutionary dynamics lead (almost surely)
to a homogenous population. The unstable interior ﬁxed point p∗ marks the
cutoﬀ between initial population fractions that will lead to a population with
all defectors (p < p∗) or all Tit-for-Tats (p > p∗). Figure 1 provides an il-
lustration for n = 25 and n = 200. Note that the basin of attraction for
the cooperative steady state is smaller for n = 200. This is an illustration of
evisceration of cooperation in large groups discovered by Boyd and Richerson
(1988) and formalized in the following corollary. The corollary, which uses Dtn
to denote the t-times iterate dynamics, follows directly from a the observation
that limn→∞ p∗ = 1.
Corollary 2 (Evisceration of Cooperation in Large Groups) For all p < 1





for all n ≥ n∗.
Boyd and Richerson view their analog of Corollary 2 as a puzzle in need of
explanation, saying:
This result satisﬁes the natural historian’s conventional wisdom: large, co-
operative, groups composed of distantly related individuals are unusual in
nature. But it leaves human cooperation unexplained.
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The next section modiﬁes this simple model in order to illustrate a potential
resolution of this puzzle.
3 A Modified Model with Homo Sapiens
The baseline model has two types: the intrinsically cooperative Tit-for-Tats,
and unconditional defectors. The defectors are actively un-cooperative: they
are hard-wired to make anti-social choices even when it runs counter to their
own narrow self-interest. A distinguishing feature of humans is their ability to
reason strategically and avoid such mistakes. This section considers how the
dynamics change when the irrational unconditional defectors from the baseline
model are replaced with selﬁshly motivated but reasoning players.
3.1 Types
Tit-for-Tat types are exactly as in the baseline model. The new genotypically
non-cooperative types are now strategic (S)-types: they are the perfectly ra-
tional, forward looking players of standard non-cooperative game theory. Type
is common knowledge within a given group. 3
3 Section 4 discusses the robustness of the conclusions to these assumptions. In
particular, it notes that for low numbers of repetitions M , “perfect rationality” is a
much stronger assumption than is necessary for the results to hold.
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3.2 Payoﬀs
Payoﬀs are determined by a subgame perfect equilibria (SPE; Selten, 1965).
Deﬁne j∗ = min{j|j ≥ (1− β)/β} and consider the following strategies:
• If j < j∗: defect in every period.
• If j ≥ j∗: cooperate in periods 1, · · · ,M − 1; defect in period M .
These strategies describe the highest payoﬀ SPE of the game. To wit: defecting
is clearly a strictly dominant strategy in period M . In period M − 1, S types
who deviate and play D gain 1 − β. This induces the T -types to defect in
period M , reducing the deviator’s utility by βj in groups with j < n T -types.
Cooperation at period M − 1 is thus consistent with a SPE if and only if
βj ≥ 1− β, i.e., if and only if j ≥ j∗. If j ≥ j∗, a similar argument shows that
cooperating in M−2, M−3, · · · , 1 is an SPE strategy if j ≥ j∗. If βj < 1−β,
then backwards induction reveals that “defect in every period” is the unique
SPE strategy for strategic types. Hence, the proposed strategies constitute a
SPE, and no other SPE can involve more cooperation.
Taking this “best” SPE to be outcome of the game, 4 the M-period payoﬀs as
a function of the number j of T -types in a group are given by:
4 Focusing on the best equilibrium is common, and it has been shown to have ﬁrm
theoretical justiﬁcations in some contexts (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990; Kim and
Sobel, 1995). The justiﬁcation for making it in this particular setting, however, is
purely pragmatic: it makes the argument as clean and simple as possible.
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0 ≤ j < j∗ j∗ ≤ j ≤ n
uT (j) βj + M − 1 (M − 1)βn + βj
uS(j) βj + M (M − 1)βn + βj + 1
(5)
For notational convenience, (5) implicitly uses uT (0) = M−1 and uS(n) = Mβn + 1,
so that uS(j) = uT (j) + 1 for all j.
3.3 Dynamics
Other than the diﬀerent payoﬀs to the two types, evolutionary dynamics are
the same as in the baseline model. Let pt denote the fraction of T -types in
generation t, let f(n, j, pt) be deﬁned as in Equation (2), and let D˜n denote
the mapping pt → pt+1, i.e.,
D˜n : pt → pt+1 =
∑n
j=0 f(n, j, pt)juT (j)∑n
j=0 f(n, j, pt) [juT (j) + (n− j)uS(j)]
. (6)
The following theorem summarizes the key properties of this mapping. A for-
mal proof appears in the Appendix.
Theorem 3 (Modified Dynamics) The points p = 0 and p = 1 are ﬁxed
points of the mapping D˜n. Point p is unstable; point p is stable. Furthermore:
(1) For all p0, limt→∞ D˜tn(p0) exists.
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(2) {D˜t(p)}∞t=0 is monotone in t: the sequence is either non-increasing for all
t or else is non-decreasing for all t.




[Insert ﬁgure 2 (a) and (b) around here]
Properties (1) and (2) of Theorem 3 state that the evolutionary dynamics are
“nice” in the sense that the fraction of T -types will converge monotonically
to some stable level (which may depend on the initial fraction of T -types).
Panel Figure 2(a) illustrates for n = 25, M = 2, and β = .2. It shows four
ﬁxed points: the stable points 0 and p∗ and the unstable points p′ and 1. The
basin of attraction of the interior ﬁxed point p∗—at which T -types “survive”
evolutionary pressures—is the range (p′, 1). When group size increases to n =
500, as in Figure 2(b), the dynamics are qualitatively similar, but both interior
ﬁxed points have moved left; the basin of attraction for the “T -types survive”
ﬁxed point p∗ has correspondingly increased; and the fraction of T -types at p∗
has decreased.
Simulations suggest that the dynamics for suﬃciently large n always have the
same qualitative two-basin-of-attraction structure. They also indicate that the




fraction” of T -types required for cooperation—and that the peak gets narrower
and narrower as n grows. 5 It thus appears to be true that there is a unique
5 If −dF (n,j,p)dp is a single peaked function of p—which seems intuitively correct and
has been borne out by all simulations, but for which there is no obvious proof—then
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stable interior ﬁxed point p∗ with the following properties: (a) for suﬃciently
large n it is always to the right of j
∗
n
; (b) it converges to zero as group size
grows; and (c) its basin of attraction converges to (0,1).
Lacking a formal proof of this conjecture, Property (3) of Theorem 3 makes a




, 1) is contained within the union of the basins of attraction of all of the
steady states strictly to the right of j
∗
n
. Hence, as n grows, the basin of at-
traction of all ﬁxed points with surviving T -types converges to (0, 1), and the
survival of some T -types is ensured.
It follows that the T -types’ survival is ensured in large groups—though ap-
parently only as small fractions of large groups. As the following corollary
establishes, however, the genotypically cooperative T -types survive in suﬃ-
cient numbers to ensure that cooperative behavior is the norm in large groups.
It asserts formally that, starting from any initial fraction of T -types, most
groups in every generation will be cooperative—in the sense that all individu-
als in these groups will cooperate in periods 1, ...,M −1—so long as the group
size is suﬃciently large. The formal proof is provided in the Appendix.
Corollary 4 (Survival of Cooperation in Large Groups) For any p0 > 0
there exists an N such that
n > N ⇒ 1− F (n, j∗ − 1, D˜tn(p0)) > 0.5 ∀t ≥ 0.
this topological structure on the dynamics would follow easily.
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Figure 3 illustrates this corollary. It ﬁxes p0 = .95 and computes the limt→∞ pt
for both the baseline dynamics (panel (a)) and the modiﬁed dynamics (panel
(b)), and plots this limit as a function of group size. In the baseline dynam-
ics, T -types go extinct when groups are larger than n = 46. In the modiﬁed
model, the surviving fraction of T -types also decreases towards zero as group
size grows, but it remains strictly positive. The second curve in panel (b) plots
the limiting fraction of types in cooperative groups—i.e. those with at least j∗
T -types and which therefore cooperate for at least M − 1 periods. It suggests
an even stronger result than Corollary 4 establishes: as group size grows, the
fraction of cooperative groups appears to approach one—so that almost ev-
erybody behaves cooperatively. All simulations have borne this stronger result
out, though a formal proof has remained elusive.
[Insert Figure 3 (a) and (b) around here]
4 Discussion and Caveats
The diﬀerence between Corollaries 2 and 4 is striking: for a ﬁxed p0, the former
states that cooperation is completely eviscerated in suﬃciently large groups;
the latter states that cooperative behavior becomes the norm in large groups.
The intuition behind this reversal is straightforward. As formalized by Price
(1970), the long-run evolutionary stability of cooperation is determined by a
horse-race between “within group” eﬀects, which favor the genotypically non-
cooperative types and “between group” eﬀects, which favor groups with more
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genotypically cooperative T -types. The evisceration of cooperation formalized
in baseline model obtains because the number of T -types needed to sustain
cooperative behavior in any given group grows with the size of the group.
Groups with suﬃciently many T -types become increasingly rare as group size
grows, so the between-group eﬀects become negligible.
In the modiﬁed model, by contrast, the fraction of T -types required to sustain
cooperative behavior in a given group decreases with group size. This is because
only a small number (j∗) of T -types in a group is needed to induce strategic
cooperation by the self-interested S-types. Combined with the growing gross
public beneﬁt of cooperation (i.e., βn − 1), this ensures that between-group
evolutionary forces come to dominate as group size grows.
This intuition makes it clear that the reversal is robust to several modiﬁcations,
such as allowing Tit-for-Tat types to have some (ﬁxed or slowly growing)
tolerance for the number of defectors, or having the public beneﬁt β decrease
with group size (so long as the gross public beneﬁt of pro-social behavior
grows suﬃciently quickly). Similarly, the qualitative results are robust to the
introduction of a small exogenous probability of “mutation” to the opposite
type during reproduction.
A number of other modeling assumptions raise potentially more signiﬁcant
concerns about the practical interpretation the results. First, one might worry
that invoking subgame perfection requires endowing strategic types with an im-
plausible amount of rationality. Second, Section 3 takes type to be observable.
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Since observability plays a critical role in generating cooperation in groups
with strategic players, it is important explore the extent to which the result
hinges on this assumption. Third, the joint assumptions of a continuum of
individuals and a deterministic environment rule out the possibility of “acci-
dental” extinction of the genotypically cooperative T -types via drift. This is
a particular concern since the fraction of T -types in the interior equilibrium
identiﬁed in Theorem 3 shrinks to zero as the group size n grows.
We consider each of these concerns in turn.
4.1 Rationality Assumptions
The baseline model of Section 2 departs from Boyd and Richerson’s (1988)
model by assuming that the number of repetitions of the game M is ﬁnite
rather than inﬁnite. With non-rational actors, this distinction is unimportant.
With strategic actors it is.
Although formal results that are qualitatively similar to those in Section 3
could be derived in an inﬁnitely repeated version of the model, the ﬁnitely
repeated version relies on substantially less stringent cognitive capability as-
sumptions for equilibrium play. When M = 2, for example, the proposed equi-
librium requires only that strategic types are able to calculate one period ahead
(and second order mutual knowledge of this fact and of rationality). This is far
less restrictive than the “common knowledge of rationality” assumption that
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would be required to ensure equilibrium in the inﬁnitely repeated version.
Qualitatively, with ﬁnite repetitions, strategic types only have to be homo
sapiens, not homo economicus.
4.2 Observability of Type
The assumption that type is perfectly observable is analytically important:
it is what allows strategic types to condition their play on the number of
genotypically cooperative T -types in their group. After discussing the extent
to which it is conceptually important, this section describes how and when
allowing self-reporting can replace the observability assumption.
4.2.1 Consequences of Relaxing Observability
To highlight the importance of the observability assumption, consider a polar
opposite case: type is completely unobservable and strategic types know only
the population fraction p of T -types.
On the one hand, individual behavior here is quite similar to behavior in the
“perfect observability” case: as in Kreps et al. (1982), there is a (Bayesian)
equilibrium with the property that, for suﬃciently large p, strategic types
cooperate with high probability in most rounds of the game. Since cooperation
is probabilistic in this equilibrium, cooperation will, on average, be higher in
groups with more cooperative T -types, just as in the perfect observability case.
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On the other hand, the evolutionary dynamics are much diﬀerent: they in-
evitably lead to complete evisceration of cooperation. Observability confers a
distinct disadvantage on S-types, since it can lead to the unraveling of cooper-
ative behavior as other S-types anticipate the last-round defections (and then
penultimate round defections, etc...). Removing observability ensures that S-
types will achieve at least weakly, and sometimes strictly higher payoﬀs than
T -types (since they can always imitate T -types).
Whether or not evolutionary forces with intermediate levels of observability
will generally eviscerate cooperation is an open—and analytically challenging—
question. Suppose, for example, type is observable, but there is some positive
probability of “recognition” errors. Then groups with more T -types will be
more likely to be cooperative than groups with fewer—just as in the “perfect
observability” case. This induces the qualitative correlation between group
composition and group payoﬀ that is necessary for between group forces to
potentially overwhelm within group forces. At the same time, imperfect observ-
ability blurs the sharp cutoﬀ at j∗ between cooperation and the lack thereof,
reducing the quantitative magnitude of this correlation. Monte Carlo simu-
lations indicate that that the “perfect observability” dynamics are robust to
the introduction of modest recognition errors for a ﬁxed group size. Whether
or not a ﬁxed error rate undermines cooperation in suﬃciently large groups
remains an open question.
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4.2.2 Self-Revelation of Type
One might hope to rely on self-reporting of type rather than assuming observ-
ability. This can be modeled by looking for a truth-telling equilibrium in a
pre-game round wherein each individual in a group simultaneously states his
type, and where play in the M-round repeated game then follows the equilib-
rium strategies from Section 3 (with the reported number j of T -types). 6
If deception is costless and impossible to observe, then truth telling is not an
equilibrium, since if (and only if) a strategic type happens to be in a group
with exactly j∗−1 T -types, unilateral mis-reporting by an S-types will improve
his payoﬀ by inducing cooperation in rounds 1, · · · ,M − 1 by his opponents.
Now suppose deception involves some small cost ε(n) and that there is some
probability P (n, j) of a group successfully “sniﬃng out” a deception. The gross
beneﬁt of unilaterally misreporting is:
(1− P (n, j∗ − 1)) [f(n, j∗ − 1, p)] [(M − 1)(βn− 1) + (2− βj∗).] (7)
Expression (7) assumes that an unsuccessful deception leads the group to
play according to the true rather than the reported j. The ﬁrst term is the
probability of not being sniﬀed out. The second term is the probability of being
in a group with exactly j∗ − 1 individuals (the only time successful unilateral
deception matters). The third term is the beneﬁt conditional on being in such
6 Gre´goire and Robson (2003) consider a qualitatively similar “pre-play” signalling
game in a model with diﬀerent dynamics.
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a group and successfully deceiving; it is computed under the assumption that
an S-type who gets away with deception subsequently cooperates in periods
1, ...,M − 2 and defects in M − 1 and M (which is optimal).












(j∗ − 1)! e
−j∗+1 (8)
is ﬁnite, the cost of deception will outweigh the expected beneﬁt in large
groups whenever ε(n)
1−P (n,j) grows slightly faster than n. In this case, engaging
in deception will be undesirable for suﬃciently large n, and the central results
of Section 3 will continue to hold. This condition is plausible. It will hold, for
example, if ε is independent of n and each strategic type has an independent
and arbitrarily small probability η > 0 of sniﬃng out a defection. Alternatively,
it will hold if deception has a per group member cost and if the likelihood of
detection increases, even arbitrarily slowly, with n.
4.3 Drift
Focusing on a model with a continuum of individuals is analytically conve-
nient. One might reasonably have concerns about the appropriateness of this
abstraction, however, especially since the population fraction of T -types in the
interior ﬁxed point identiﬁed in Corollary 4 shrinks zero as group size grows. In
particular, random ﬂuctuations could reduce the realized fraction of T -types
in a given generation into the basin of attraction of the steady state at p = 0
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(viz Figure 2) and lead to their eventual extinction.
A back of the envelope calculation is useful for assessing the quantitative im-
portance of this concern. A generous time-frame for human evolution is on the
order of 100,000 generations. To have a better than 50% chance of surviving
this long, the probability of extinction in any given generation should be less
than approximately 10−5. So if ﬂuctuations large enough to eliminate T -types
in a given generation are “5-sigma” events, then they are not quantitatively
problematic.
Consider mean-zero shocks which cause the realized fraction of p of T -types in
a given generation to be approximately normally distributed around the ex-
pected value p∗ (i.e., the interior equilibrium). If the stochasticity is individual-
speciﬁc, the variance of this distribution will scale as η/(p∗N), where N is the
total population size, and η is a measure of the individual-level ﬂuctuations,
which we conservatively take to be 1. 7 (For a concrete example, suppose that
each T -type “birth” has a probability η/2 each of producing twins or of being
stillborn.)
Extinction of T -types will result if random ﬂuctuations lead their population
fraction to fall below (1−α)p∗ for some α. (In Figure 2, α = p′
p∗ .) This will be
7 Focusing on individual-speciﬁc shocks is reasonable here since the aggregate pop-
ulation shocks that uniformly both T - and S-types will not aﬀect p.
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N ≥ 5. (9)
Or, for small β, approximately when (5/α)2(βn)3 ≤ N. Boyd et al. (2003)
use βn = 2, 4 and 8; these imply robustness to drift if N > 800/α2, 6400/α2,
and 51, 200/α2 for βn = 2, 4 and 8, respectively, so long as the interior steady
state exists. 8 For b = 8, simulations indicate that α ≈ .5 when n = 100
(which Boyd et al. (2003) suggest is reasonable for representing evolution in
small scale societies). Then cooperation is robust to drift as long as the total
population N is on the order of 500, 000. For b = 4 and n = 100 and 1000,
drift is unproblematic even for N = 20, 000 and N = 100, 000, respectively. So
the drift-free model appears to be a reasonable abstraction.
5 Conclusions
Theorem 3 and its corollary show how the received wisdom that cooperative
behavior is evolutionarily unstable in large groups is highly sensitive to model-
ing assumptions: simply replacing the biological automata of standard models
with forward-looking strategic players, cooperation in large groups becomes
the norm, completely overturning standard “impossibility of cooperation large
8 Boyd et al. (2003) ﬁx b ≡ βn instead of β. Theorem 3 assumes a ﬁxed β, so it
does not guarantee an interior steady state for large n; such an interior steady state
will always exist for suﬃciently large M .
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groups” results. Though suggestive, the results herein can hardly be regarded
as dispositive regarding the evolutionary causes of human cooperation: the
model on which they are based is simply too stylized. 9
Instead, the central results of this paper are best viewed as illustrative of two
important ideas. First, the potential importance of human facultative reason-
ing skills—arguably the deﬁning characteristic of homo sapiens—should re-
ceive greater emphasis in explanations of why our species is essentially unique
in exhibiting large scale cooperation among unrelated individuals. But this ex-
planation is probably best viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute
for other recently proposed resolutions of the puzzle of human exceptional-
ism. 10 Gintis (2000), for example, argues that the combination of strong reci-
procity (punishment of non-cooperative behavior) and uniquely human abili-
ties which make punishment “cheaper” (such as tool-making, hunting ability,
9 For example, enriching the set of types and interactions would almost certainly
yield a more complex set of evolutionary dynamics and complicate the clean cut
results of this streamlined model. As pointed out by Doebeli and Hauert (2005),
alternative games can yield signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results; and actual evolutionary
processes almost certainly involve a multiplicity of diﬀerent types of “games.” Fur-
thermore, Lindgren’s (1991) tournaments and theoretical studies of complex dy-
namical systems indicate that highly complex and diﬃcult to analyze dynamics are
likely to be the norm in real-world dynamical processes.
10 Even if it were the explanation for large scale human cooperation, sapience would’t
fully resolve the “puzzle” of human exceptionalism; it merely reduces the question
to why our sapience is exceptional.
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and stone throwing) can help to resolve it. 11 It seems likely that strategic pun-
ishment by sapient types—the analog of strategic cooperation—would further
enhance the evolutionary case for strong reciprocity.
Bowles (2006) emphasizes group selection in the context of cultural trans-
mission of reproductive leveling institutions such as monogamy and points out
that this transmission is only possible in light of humans’ cognitive and linguis-
tic abilities. Closely related is Wilson and Wilson’s (2007) and Wilson et al.’s
(2008) strong advocacy for multi-level selection theory. They argue that that
humans have undergone a “major transition” to a fundamentally “groupish”
nature so that human groups eﬀectively behave as evolutionary units. This
major transition was theoretically facilitated by social control mechanisms
associated with moral systems which “suppress[ed] ﬁtness diﬀerences within
groups and made it possible for between-group selection to become an impor-
tant evolutionary force” (Wilson and Wilson, 2007, page 343).
There are several ways in which strategically rational players may have been
instrumental in helping humans to undergo such a major transition. For ex-
ample, sapient types’ imitation of genotypic cooperators represents a form of
the reproductive leveling within groups that is central to allowing between-
group forces to become operative. And the non-linear phenotype-genotype
relationship which results as strategic types imitate genotypically cooperative
11 There is some debate over the evolutionary stability. See, e.g., Dreber et al. (2008)
and Ga¨chter et al. (2008).
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types undermines much of the force of the argument against group selection
(Williams, 1966) and can strongly enhance group-selection pressures (Wilson,
2004). Furthermore, strategic rationality may have been helpful in developing
moral systems or institutions for providing “top-down” rewards (as in Cuesta
et al., 2008).
The second key idea in this paper is the identiﬁcation and distillation of an
heretofore under-appreciated symbiosis between self-interest and reciprocal
altruism. The literal “prediction” of Section 3’s model—that human societies
will consist of many purely self-interested individuals induced to cooperate by
the presence of a small proportion of intrinsically cooperative individuals—
is not correct; most humans clearly have both cooperative and strategically
self-interested proclivities. But, the model provides a clear illustration of how
these two proclivities can be mutually reinforcing.
The synergy between strategic self-interest and innate cooperativeness indi-
cates the potential utility of reconciling the diﬀerent modeling conventions used
by economists and evolutionary social scientists. Economists typically assume
the individuals in their models to be rational and ruthlessly self-interested
cognitive supermen (with occasional, if misguided, appeals to evolutionary
metaphors to “justify” this assumption). In contrast, evolutionary social sci-
entists have typically employed evolutionary game theory to show how evolu-
tionary forces aﬀect biological automata sans reasoning skills. The observation
that large groups of unrelated humans frequently cooperate in real-world pub-
lic goods settings poses a puzzle for economists and evolutionary theorists
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alike: in economists’ models, rational self-interest is predicted to undermine
cooperation. Evolutionary social scientists have found that evolutionary mod-
els with automata have been unsupportive of cooperative behavior in large
unrelated groups. The results herein suggest that synthesizing these two ap-
proaches with agents with intermediate cognitive abilities can potentially help
to resolve both sides of the puzzle.
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6 Appendix
PROOF. [Proof of Theorem 1] First note that payoﬀs are strictly positive.




(juT (j) + (n− j)uU(j)) f(n, j, pt)
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and note that (n− j)uU(j) = (n− j)(uT (j) + 1). Then
(pt+1 − pt)nu¯t=∑nj=0 juT (j)f(n, j, pt)
−pt∑nj=0 (juT (j) + (n− j)(uT (j) + 1)) f(n, j, pt)
=
∑n
j=0(j − ptn)uT (j)f(n, j, pt)− pt
∑n
j=0(n− j)f(n, j, pt)
=
∑n
j=0 ((j − ptn) (βj + M − 1) f(n, j, pt))+
(n− ptn) (βMn− (βn + M − 1)) f(n, n, pt)− npt(1− pt)
(10)
The variance and expected value of j are
∑n
j=0 ((j − ptn)jf(n, j, pt)) = npt(1− pt)
and
∑n
j=0 (jf(n, j, pt)) = npt, respectively, and f(n, n, pt) = p
n
t . We can there-
fore re-write Equation (10) as
(pt+1 − pt)nu¯t = npt(1− pt)
(
(βn− 1)(M − 1)pn−1t − (1− β)
)
. (11)
Denote the right-hand-side of Equation (11) by Δ(pt). Note that Δ(pt) ≥ 0 ⇔ pt+1 > pt.
Δ(pt) is a continuous function of pt with three real zeros at p = 0, p = 1
and p = p∗. Our assumption that n > (2 − β)/β ensures p∗ ∈ (0, 1). Also,
Δ′(0) = −n(1− β) < 0; similarly, Δ′(1) < 0 and Δ′(p∗) > 0. Hence, pt+1 < pt
∀p ∈ (0, p∗) and pt+1 > pt ∀p ∈ (p∗, 1), completing the proof.
PROOF. [Proof of Theorem 3] As in the proof of Theorem 1, deﬁne global
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average payoﬀs u¯t and note that:
(pt+1 − pt)nu¯t=∑nj=0(j − ptn)uT (j)f(n, j, pt)− pt∑nj=0(n− j)f(n, j, pt)
=
∑n
j=0 ((j − ptn) (βj + M − 1) f(n, j, pt))+
∑n
j=j∗(j − ptn)(M − 1)(βn− 1)f(n, j, pt)− npt(1− pt)





− (1− β)npt(1− pt),
(12)
where the last step uses the following two observations:
(1)
∑n




= f(n, j, p) (j−np)
p(1−p) (as is easily veriﬁed by direct computation).
This directly conﬁrms the (obvious) fact that p = 0 and p = 1 are ﬁxed points.
When pt ∈ (0, 1), the sign of pt+1 − pt is equal to the sign of
− 1− β










The ﬁrst term is strictly negative, and independent of pt. The second term
is strictly positive. The stability properties will follow by establishing that
−dF (n,j∗−1,p)
dp
→ 0 as p → 0 or p→ 1.
Stability properties of p and p: For pt ≈ 1:
F (n, j∗ − 1, p) ≈ n!
(n− j∗ + 1)!, (j∗ − 1)!(1− p)
n−j∗+1
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(plus higher order terms in (1 − p); intuitively, the tails of the binomial dis-
tribution fall oﬀ fast, so the bulk of the mass to the left of j∗ is concentrated
at j∗ − 1.) Since n − j∗ + 1 ≥ 2 (which follows from βn > 2 − β > 1),
dF (n,j∗−1,pt)
dp
→ 0 as p → 1. Similarly, dF (n,j∗−1,pt)
dp
→ 0 as pt → 0. We conclude
that pt+1 − pt is negative as pt → 0 or pt → 1, so that p and p are stable and
unstable, respectively.
Existence of (monotone) limits (Properties (1) and (2)): It is straight-
forward to establish from Equations (5) and (6) (e.g., with some tedious alge-
bra) that
p ≥ q ⇒ D˜np ≥ D˜nq. (14)
Taking any p0 with D˜n(p0) = p1 ≥ p0, this ensures that pt ≡ D˜tnp0 is a non-
decreasing sequence, whereby p∞ ≡ limt→∞ D˜tn(p) exists. A similar argument
applies if D˜n(p0) < p0.
Convergence to limits greater than j
∗
n
(Property (3)). For suﬃciently




for all n ≥ N ; Property (3) will





















































whenever n ≥ N , completing the proof.
PROOF. [Proof of Corollary 4] From Theorem 3, there exists N¯ such that




p0, take Nˆ = max{N¯, j∗p0}, and any n > Nˆ . Then p0 ≥ j
∗
n









for all t. The fraction of cooperative groups is thus greater than the probability




As n → ∞, this binomial distribution converges to the Poisson distribution
with expected value j∗. Adell and Jodra´ (2005) show that Gj∗(j∗ − 1) < 0.5,
where Gj∗(·) is the cumulative density function for the Poisson distribution









= 1−Gj∗(j∗ − 1) > 0.5,
so there exists N ≥ Nˆ such that n > N ensures







































Fig. 1. Dynamics in the baseline model with β = .2, M = 2 for group sizes (a) n = 25
and (b) n = 200. To the left (right) of p∗, pt+1 < pt (pt+1 > pt), and intrinsically
cooperative T -types (uncooperative U -types) die oﬀ over time. Increasing group size
move the cutoﬀ p∗ towards 1.
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Fig. 2. Dynamics in the modiﬁed model with β = .2, M = 2 for group sizes (a) n = 25
and (b) n = 500. The points p∗ and p ≡ 0 are stable steady states with basins
of attraction (p′, 1) and (0, p′), respectively, where p′ is an unstable steady state.
Increasing group size moves p∗ towards 0, and increasing p∗’s basin of attraction
(p′, 1).
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individuals in cooperative groups
cooperative genotype individuals
(b)
Fig. 3. The limiting fraction of genotypically cooperative individuals (i.e., limt→∞ pt)
and cooperative groups (limt→∞ 1−F (n, j∗−1, pt)) when p0 = .95 for various group
sizes in the baseline and modiﬁed dynamics. Note that in the baseline dynamics,
the limiting fraction of cooperative groups is identical to the limiting fraction of
genotypically cooperative individuals.
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